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STATE DEBT UNDER
THE 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION:
THE LEGISLATURE UNBOUND
INTRODUCTION

On the first Saturday in July, 1870, the people of Illinois
ratified a constitution.1 Roughly one hundred years later, on
December 5, 1970, their successors performed the same decisive
act.2 The significance of these acts of ratification is emphasized
by the role a constitution plays in the traditional scheme of state
government. The relationship which exists between a state constitution and the representative body in which legislative powers
are vested is utterly different from the relationship which exists
between the Federal Constitution and the representative body
which is the United States Congress:
That the legislative power of the State has been conferred generally
upon the legislature is not denied, and that all such power may be
exercised by that body, except so far as it is expressly withheld,
is a proposition which admits of no doubt. It is true that, in construing the Federal Constitution, Congress must be held to have
only those powers which are granted expressly or by necessary implication, but the opposite rule is the one to be applied to the
construction of a State constitution. The legislature of a State

may exercise all powers which are properly legislative unless they
are forbidden by the State or National Constitution.
This is a
principle that has never been called in question. 3
Illinois courts accord with this fundamental principle of constitutional law and have consistently held that the office of the Illinois
constitution is to restrain the General Assembly: "The Illinois
constitution is not regarded as a grant of powers to the legislature, but rather as a restriction on the legislature's power to
ac t . 4
The theory upon which this canon of constitutional law is
founded is a basic one: in a representative form of government,
all powers of government belong ultimately to the people in their
sovereign corporate capacity;- the people are the source of all
governmental and political powers and the supreme authority or
i ILL. CONST. schedule, § 8 (1870).
2 ILL. CONST. adoption schedule, § 1 (1970).
Railroad Co. v. County of Otoe, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 667, 672-73 (1872)
(emphasis added).
4 North Shore Post No. 21 of American Legion v. Korzen, 38 Ill. 2d 231,
233, 230 N.E.2d 833, 835 (1967). Accord, Droste v. Kerner, 34 Ill. 2d 495,
217 N.E.2d 73 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 456 (1967) ; Locust Grove Cemetery Ass'n v. Rose, 16 Ill. 2d 132, 156 N.E.2d 577 (1959).
5 Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600, 149 N.E. 526 (1925).
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It follows that the
sovereignty ultimately resides with them.
people may, at their pleasure, withhold such powers or delegate
and distribute them among various departments of government.
State debt provisions have been woven into the fabric of
Illinois constitutions since the Constitution of 1848.T Because the
people may restrain the legislature in any way they choose and
because the state debt provisions of the Illinois Constitution of
1970 substantially differ from those of prior Illinois constitutions,
it is appropriate to examine the new state debt provision, article
IX section 9, to determine what the new restraints are. If the
people of Illinois are to be able to anticipate its performance,
article IX section 9 must be brought from the chorus of other
constitutional provisions and made to stand center stage; for the
new state debt provision has a character which greatly differs
from that of its veteran predecessor. After the drafters of the new
charter determined that the old provisions were too restrictive,
they embarked upon the bold experiment of their abolition. In
order to illuminate the substantial changes worked by the delegates who went to Springfield in 1970, it will first be necessary
to list in detail the state debt provisions of both the 1870 and 1970
Illinois Constitutions.
THE

1870

CONSTITUTION

The revenue and finance provisions of the 1870 Constitution are scattered among several articles of that instrument. The
majority of provisions relevant to the purposes of this comment
are found in article IV dealing with the powers of the legislature.
Section 18, "Expenses of government - State debts," is the substantially controlling section. Regarding the legislature's power
to incur state debt, the section imposes a number of conditions
of clear restriction and absolute prohibition.
1. While a definition of the term "state debt" would seem
appropriate, no such definition appears in section 18. Subsequent cases have given a widely accepted meaning to the term by
judicially construing "state debt" to encompass instruments to be
retired through a tax levied by the state8 and obligations which
are to be retired from revenues of the state, even though the
levy of a direct tax is not involved. 9
2.

To meet casual deficiencies or failures of revenue, the

6 People v. Barnett, 344 Ill. 62, 176 N.E. 108 (1931).
G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIvE ANALYSIS 186 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BRADEN &
COHN].
s People ex rel. City of Chicago v. Barrett, 373 Ill. 393, 26 N.E. 478
(1940).
9 People ex rel. Greening v. Green, 382 Ill. 577, 47 N.E.2d 465 (1943).
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legislature was empowered to borrow an amount up to an absolute ceiling of $250,000:
[T]he state may, to meet casual deficits or failures in revenues,
contract debts never to exceed in the aggregate $250,000 . .

..

3. A referendum at a general election was required in order
to pledge the full faith and credit of the state for a debt in excess
of $250,000:
[N]o other debt, except for the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, or defending the state in war, (for payment
of which the faith of the state shall be pledged,) shall be contracted
unless the law authorizing the same shall, at a general election,
have been submitted to the people, and have received a majority
of the votes cast for members of the general assembly at such
election.11
4. Publication of the law authorizing a debt in excess of
$250,000 was a condition precedent to its validity:
The general assembly shall provide for the publication of said law
for three months at least before the vote of the people shall be taken
upon the same .... 15. Provision for retirement of the debt must also have
been made:
[P]rovision shall be made, at the time, for the payment of the
interest annually, as it shall accrue, by a tax levied for the purpose
or from other sources of revenue: which law, providing for the
payment of such interest by such tax, shall be irrepealable until
such debt be paid . .

.13

6. Submission to the people of the law authorizing the tax
to retire the debt was also requisite:
[T]he law levying the tax shall be submitted14 to the people with
the law authorizing the debt to be contracted.
7. An imperative direction as to the disposition of funds
obtained through state debt was included:
[M]oneys thus borrowed shall be applied to the purpose for which
they were obtained, or to pay the debt thus created, and no other
purpose ....

15

In addition to the restrictions on state debt, section 18 of
article IV checked the legislator's general power to appropriate.
8.

All appropriations were limited as to their longevity:
Each general assembly shall provide for all the appropriations
necessary for the ordinary and contingent expenses of the government until the expiration of the first fiscal quarter after the adjournment of the next regular session . .
10 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (1870)

11Id. (emphasis added).
12

Id.

Id.
14 Id.
15Id.
16
Id.
13

(emphasis added).
(emphasis added).
(emphasis added).
(emphasis added).

.16

(emphasis added).
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9. In the event that the legislature did not adhere to the
durational limitation, section 18 provided for lapse:
IA 1ll appropriations, general or special, requiring money to be paid
out of the state treasury, from funds belonging to the state, shall
end with such fiscal quarter .... 17
10. The aggregate amount of appropriations could be increased only by following specific procedural steps:
[Tihe aggregate amount [of all appropriations] shall not be increased without a vote of two-thirds of the members elected to
each house, nor exceed the amount of revenue authorized by law
to be raised in such time ....

Is

Section 20 of article IV is also relevant to this discussion in
that it announced an absolute prohibition against using state
revenues to pay debts incurred by entities or individuals other
than the General Assembly:
The state shall never pay, assume or become responsible for
the debts or liabilities of, or in any manner give, loan or extend
its credit to or in1 aid
of any public or other corporation, associa9
tion or individual.

Article V, the article of the 1870 Constitution dealing with
the executive, had tucked within section 16 a pertinent provision
affecting all appropriation bills:
Bills making appropriations of money . . . shall specify the
objects and purposes for which the same are made .... 20
17Id. (emphasis added).
For cases discussing the lapse provision, see
Bowes v. Howlett, 24 Ill. 2d 545, 182 N.E.2d 191 (1962) ; People ex rel.
Millner v. Russel, 311 Ill. 96, 142 N.E. 537 (1924) ; People ex rel. Brinkerhoff
v. Swigert, 107 Il. 494 (1883) ; People v. Lippincott, 64 Ill. 256 (1872). See
also BRADEN & COHN 186-87 where it is stated:
The provision for appropriations is fuzzy and indefinite, but if the
unexpressed assumptions of the drafters of the 1848 and 1870 Constitutions are considered, it is reasonably clear what was intended. In 1848,
it was assumed that the General Assembly would appropriate enough
money to run the government until the next General Assembly could
again appropriate money to run the government. The drafters of the
1870 Constitution modified the earlier provision on the assumption that
appropriations for running the government would be for a two-year
period beginning July 1. This came about because Section 13 . . .
made legislation effective July 1, and the delegates assumed that the
General Assembly would normally finish its regular session prior to April
1.

.

.

.

The extra fiscal quarter was designed to provide a two-year

'budget.'
. . .
Over the years, regular sessions got longer and June 30 became the
normal adjournment target. Thus, the 'expiration of the first fiscal
quarter' after adjournment became an 'overlapping' quarter in which the
previous biennium's appropriations and the new biennium's appropriations were available. The proposed 1922 Constitution sought to clear up
this confusion by providing that appropriations were for a two-year
period from July 1 to June 30, but that money obligated before June
30 could be paid up to September 30.
The fuzzy language of Section 18 made it possible recently for the
Attorney General to advise the Chairman of the Commission on the
Organization of the General Assembly that not only could the legislature
turn itself into an 'annual session' body [but] it could [also] adopt annual appropriation acts.
' ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (1870)
(emphasis added).
19 Id. art. IV § 20 (emphasis added).
2o M. art. V, 1 16.
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The foregoing litany of provisions and prohibitions amply
manifests the attitude of the delegates who assembled to draft
the third constitution of Illinois, the Constitution of 1870. Faced
with the practical necessity of legislative appropriation, they
drafted numerous safeguards intended to moderate the indispensable legislative entry into the public till. Aware of the possibility that future happenings might warrant the incurring
of state debt to accomplish the legitimate purposes of government, they erected constitutional barriers intended to check any
legislative propensity to postpone taxation through borrowing.
In short, public funds and the full faith and credit of the state
remained vested in the depository of legislative power, but each
was well guarded by the vigilant sentries of constitutional mandate and prohibition. From an historical standpoint, it is not at
all surprising that the mandates were numerous and the prohibitions absolute.
The Roots of Debt Limitation
Eleven years before the ratification of the Constitution of
1848, which was the first Illinois constitution containing restrictions on either the appropriation process or the incurring of
debt, 21 the nation was beset with the depression known as the
Panic of 1837.22 For more than a decade before the "panic,"
discussions about local internal improvements, especially regarding the building of railroads, canals and better roads, were in
vogue in Illinois and other states:
[B]etween 1829 and 1836 various local projects for internal improvements had been broached, discussed, expanded, all of them
being based on more and more extravagant calculations of profits.
The time was ripe for their friends to unite, and by bargains of
one sort or another to commit the state to putting under construction a wild and fantastic system of internal improvements.3
The Illinois General Assembly was caught in the rush for internal
improvements and passed legislation which launched the state
on what was later called "mad speculation. ' 2- The mania for
internal improvement was not satisfied even by the legislatively
approved internal government system itself; for private enterprise flourished side by side with it. But the speculative boom
was short-lived, and the collapse which was ultimately to follow
began in 1837. The panorama of the collapse has been ably
21 Note 7 supra. See also ILL. CONST. art. III, § 37, 38 (1848).

22 For a complete history of the factors surrounding the Panic of 1837
and its consequences in Illinois, see T. PEASE, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF
ILLINOIS (1922); J. KRENKEL, ILLINOIS INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1818-

1848 (1958); and A. COLE, THE ERA

2 T. PEASE, THE CENTENNIAL
1818-1848, at 205 (1922).
24 Id. at 215.
23

OF THE CIVIL WAR,

HISTORY OF ILLINOIS,

1848-1870 (1919).

The FrontierState
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summarized in a recent work on state debt as follows:
Much has been written about the causes of the 1837 depression ...the rapid rise in state borrowing for unsuccessful internal
improvements was undoubtedly a contributing factor. The severe
panic of 1837 did not lead to an immediate reduction in state borrowing for several reasons. Many states had incomplete projects
on their hands that had to be completed before revenues which
would service the debt incurred for the projects could be realized.
This fact, coupled with a general feeling that the recession was
temporary and that business was 'fundamentally sound,' encouraged states to go ahead with their building programs.
The later collapse in 1839 and 1840 signaled the seriousness of
the economic depression, and most state building programs came
to a halt. States were beset by the problems of decreasing revenues
due to the depression and mounting debt service requirements.
Many canals and railroads constructed in this period were never
completed and failed to provide any revenues, but nonetheless the
debts had to be serviced. States were further hindered in their
attempts to meet their debts by a general deficiency in state tax
structures. Inevitably, the most burdened states defaulted on their
debts and eventually, several states repudiated portions of their
25
debts.
In 1842 repudiation of Illinois' debts appeared to some to be

inevitable, but under the leadership of an executive branch committed to fiscal integrity, the legislature adopted a resolution rec-

ognizing that the state had a moral and legal obligation to pay
every cent contracted by its agents. 21 In 1880, more than four
decades after repudiation seemed inevitable, the last bonds were

called in.
In the interim, there was a widespread belief that the rapid
development of Illinois made a revision of the 1818 Constitution

advisable which culminated in the assemblage of one hundred
and sixty-two delegates in the summer of 1848. With the dismal failure of internal improvement financing through state borrowing a graphic and recent memory to all of the delegates,
they drafted the first Illinois constitution which restricted state

borrowing.27

As a recent historian put it:

No longer could the lawmakers plunge the state into debt through
grandiose public works and banking schemes; only by referendum
approval of a specific law could the legislature contract debts in

excess of fifty thousand dollars.

Another provision made it im-

possible
to grant the state's credit to any corporation or associa28

tion.

When Illinois delegates once again assembled to draft the
Constitution of 1870, they retained the rigid restrictions on
A.

HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBT 7
[hereinafter cited as HEINS].
26 R. HOWARD, ILLINOIS 227-36 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HOWARD].
2? See BRADEN & COHN 186. See also ILL. CONST. art. III, §§ 37, 38
25

(1963)

(1848).
28

HOWARD at 233.
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The memory of the
state borrowing of the 1848 Constitution.'
financial fiasco of the 1830's was strong enough to give rise to
visions of the state once again teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, if the restrictions were removed.-u Whatever visions
danced in the heads of the framers of the 1970 Constitution, they
were not visions of state bankruptcy.
THE 1970

CONSTITUTION

The state debt provisions of the 1970 Constitution are found
in article IX, the Revenue Article, which specifically deals with
the legislature's power to raise revenue and other related revenue
matters. Section 9, "State Debt," is a comprehensive section
outlining the legislature's power to pledge the full faith and
credit of the state: "No State debt shall be incurred except as
provided in this Section." 31 . An examination of the subsections of
this provision will begin to reveal the substantial alteration
worked by the drafters of the 1970 charter.
1. A broad definition of "state debt," which incorporates
prior judicial construction of the term and a great deal more,

acts as a preface to the section:
For the purpose of this Section, 'State debt' means bonds or other
evidences of indebtedness which are secured by the full faith and
credit of the State or are required to be repaid, directly or indirectly, from tax revenue and which are incurred by the State, any
department, authority, public corporation or quasi-public corporation of the State, any State college or university, or any other
public agency created by the State, but not by units of local gov32
ernment, or school districts.

2. No dollar limit is placed on the amount of debt that can
be incurred by the legislature:
State debt for specific purposes may be incurred or the pay-

IV, §§ 18, 20; art. V, § 16 (1870). It is worthy of
note that the 1848 Constitution differed from the 1870 Constitution in only
three aspects: (1) appropriations were for the period ending with adjournment of the next legislature instead of at the end of a fiscal quarter following
adjournment; (2) the lapsing of appropriations was not covered; and (3) the
temporary deficit debt limit was only $50,000. See BRADEN & COHN 186.
30 See HEINS at vi where it is stated:
Constitutional prohibitions against state debt were born out of the
financial difficulties encountered by numerous states prior to 1845.
Caught by the depression of 1837 in an overextended debt position, nine
states defaulted on their debt. Public revulsion in many states forced
the adoption of constitutional amendments that prohibited future borrowing by state legislatures for works of internal improvement. In some
states, the prohibition was mitigated by the inclusion of a referendum
provision which permitted the electorate to approve borrowing for specific purposes; but in other states the restriction was absolute. Without
exception, states joining the Union after 1845 wrote some form of debt
restriction into their constitutions.
31 ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a) (1970).
32 Id.
(emphasis added). Note that "units of local government" are defined in the new constitution as:
counties, municipalities, townships, special districts, and units designated as units of local government by law, which exercise limited gov29 ILL. CONST. art.
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ment of State or other debt guaranteed in such amounts as may be
provided ....31
3. The referendum once constitutionally requisite to incurring state debt in excess of $250,000 has been diluted to an alternative method of approving state debt legislation:
either in a law passed by the vote of three-fifths of the members
elected to each house of the General Assembly or in a law approved
on the question at the next
by a majority of the electors voting
4
general election following passage.'

4. Publication of the law authorizing the debt is no longer
required, irrespective of whether the debt legislation is effected
5
by referendum or by legislative action only.
5. Provision for retirement of the debt must still be made:
Any law providing for the incurring or guaranteeing of debt shall
set forth . . . the manner of repayment.'a
6. Submission to the people of the law which will effect
retirement of the debt (by a direct tax or other means) is no
37
longer required.
7. No imperative direction as to the disposition of funds
acquired through state debt is included, other than the "specific
purposes" language mentioned below. 8
40
8. Neither the Finance Article," nor the Revenue Article,
contain either a time limitation on appropriations or state debt,
or a lapse provision.
9. Neither the Finance Article nor the Revenue Article
contain specific constitutional procedures which must be pursued
in order to increase the aggregate amount of appropriations."
10. The absolute and emphatic prohibition against assuming responsibility for the debts of entities other than the state
no longer obtains:
'State debt' means bonds or other evidence of indebtedness .. .incurred by the State, any department, authority, public corporation
or quasi-public corporation of the State, any State college or university, or any other public agency created by the State . . .42
11.

The General Assembly is now empowered to authorize,

ernmental powers or powers in respect to limited governmental subjects,
but does not include school districts.
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1970).
33 ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
34 Id. (emphasis added).
35 Id. § 9.
36 Id. § 9(b)
(emphasis added).
37 Id. § 9.
38/d.

39 ILL. CONST. art. VIII (1970).
40 ILL. CONST. art. IX (1970).
41
42

Notes 39 and 40 supra.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a)

(1970)

(emphasis added).
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by ordinary majority, limited amounts of short-term state debt:
State debt in anticipation of revenues to be collected in a fiscal
year may be incurred by law in an amount not exceeding 5% of
the State's appropriations for that fiscal year. Such debt shall be
retired from the revenues realized in that fiscal year.'"
State debt may be incurred by law in an amount not exceeding
15% of the State's appropriations for that fiscal year to meet deficits caused by emergencies or failures of revenue. Such law shall
provide that the debt be repaid within one year of the date it is
4
incurred.
If the requisite circumstances exist, these authorizations can apparently be combined. In such a case, the General Assembly, by
ordinary majority, could borrow (on short term) an amount
equal to 20% of the state's annual appropriations.
12. The legislature has power to enact a bill incurring a
new state debt to refund an outstanding debt by a majority vote,
if the refunding debt matures within the term of the state debt
being refunded:
State debt may be incurred by law to refund outstanding State
debt if the refunding debt matures within the term of the out5
standing State debt.4
13. Debts not pledging the full faith and credit of the state
can also be authorized by the legislature by ordinary majority:
The State, departments, authorities, public corporations and
quasi-public corporations of the State, the State colleges and universities and other public agencies created by the State, may issue
bonds or other evidences of indebtedness which are not secured by
the full faith and credit or tax revenue of the State nor required to
be repaid, directly or indirectly, from tax revenue, for such purposes
4
and in such amounts as may be authorized by law.
14. Any law which provides for the incurrence of state
debt must set forth the "specific purposes" for which the debt is
incurred:
State debt for specific purposes may be incurred ....47 Any
law providing for the incurring or guaranteeing of debt shall set
forth the specific purpose ....41
15. The general provisions of the Finance Article complement the "specific purposes" requirements noted above:
Public funds, property or credit shall be used only for public
purposes.
The State, units of local government and school districts shall
incur obligations for payment or make payments from public funds
only as authorized by law or ordinance.49
43 Id. § 9(c).
44Id. § 9(d).
45Id. § 9(e).
46

Id.§ 9(f).
§ 9 (b).

4,Id.
48

Id.
49 ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, (a) & (b)

(1970).
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The mere enumeration of state debt provisions in the new

charter begins to make the differences between the old and new
constitutions and the changes in attitude between the drafters
of each document prominent. A close comparison of the two instruments will bring the dissimilarities into high relief.
THE 1870

AND

1970

CONSTITUTIONS FACE

TO

FACE

The 1870 Constitution did not contain a Finance Article.
It was the opinion of the Committee on Revenue and Finance of
the 1970 Constitutional Convention, however, that it would be
more appropriate to consolidate provisions relevant to fiscal control in a single article rather than scatter them among several articles, as was the case in the old constitution, and they so stated:
The Finance Article is new; the 1870 constitution contains nothing
comparable. Several provisions -dealing with various aspects of
the fiscal procedures of the State appear in the Executive and Legislative Articles of the present constitution. They do not present a
coherent finance system; many of the provisions are archaic and
restrictive. The Committee recommends elimination of them in
favor of a relatively simple and flexible Finance Article which allocates the responsibility for fiscal decision-making between the
executive and legislative branches and opens up the entire fiscal
process of the state and local government to public scrutiny. 50
Though the 1870 Constitution did contain a Revenue Ar-

ticle, 5 1 the Committee on Revenue and Finance thought some restructuring was necessary here, too:
The Revenue Article presented by the Committee is shorter,
simpler and, in our judgment,
better-organized than Article IX of
52
the 1870 Constitution.
Even a cursory comparison of the two constitutions leads
to the conclusion that at least from an organizational standpoint,
the committee was justified in its assertion that the restructuring
of these articles in the new constitution was more orderly and
logical than they had been in the old constitution.,, This orderly
5o REC. OF PROC., SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONV., Committee Proposals Vol.
VII at 2001 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as Committee Proposals].
From an organizational standpoint, the committee was justified in asserting that the structure of the new article was coherent and logical: Sections 1 and 2 were general provisions dealing with state and local government. Sections 3 through 6, in order, dealt with the various stages of state
finance. Section 3 provided for an executive budget; sections 4 and 5 dealt
with the appropriation process and section 6 provided for a post audit of
state funds. Section 7 gave the General Assembly authority to establish
local accounting and reporting systems. The article which finally emerged
from the convention and was submitted to the people preserved this order,
but with only four sections, making use of seven subsections.
!"

ILL. CONST. art. IX (1870).

Committee Proposals at 2052. The organization of the committee's proposed Revenue Article was essentially the same as that ratified by the voters.
ach contained nine sections (the 1870 Constitution had a Revenue Article
composed of thirteen sections.) The only significant organizational change
was the replacement of the proposed section 5, 'State Assessed Property' with
proposed section 4.2, 'Personal Property Taxation.'
52

State Debt

new structure assists inquiry into the content of the provisions,
beginning with the new definition of "state debt."
As quoted earlier, "state debt" is broadly defined in the new
constitution to include all evidences of indebtedness secured by
the full faith and credit of the state, required to be repaid directly
or indirectly from tax revenue, and which are incurred by the
state or any agency thereof, but not by units of local government
or school districts.5- The etymology of the definition is somewhat
difficult to trace. Its foundation was laid in the committee's
first proposal. 5' The Style, Drafting and Submission Committee,
in reordering the sequence of the entire section, defined "state"
and "debt" individually.-5 The definition ratified by the voters
appears to be a confluence of the two individual definitiohs,56
which were united sometime before the final reading of the
section.
In an effort to minimize the possibility that the courts might
hold that an "agency" created by the legislature was not within
the definition of "state," the Committee on Revenue and Finance
included the words "and other agencies of the State, whether
established by the Constitution or by law. ' 5 The Style Committee substituted the words "public agency created by the State"
as more clearly establishing the same purpose5 It appears that the underlying purpose of the Committee on
Revenue and Finance in broadening the definition of "state"
agency to include any "public agency created by the State" was
53 Note .31 supra.
54 See Committee Proposals at 2174 where it is stated:
This section shall apply to every department, authority, public corporation and quasi-public corporation of the State, and to State colleges
and universities and other agencies of the State, whether established by
this Constitution or by law, but shall not apply to any local government.
55
See Committee Proposals at 2255 where it is stated:
For the purposes of this Section, 'State' includes every department, authority, public corporation and quasi-public corporation of the State;
every State college and university; and every other public agency created by the State; but does not include units of local government or
school districts. For purposes of this Section, 'debt' includes bonds or
other evidence of indebtedness whether secured by the full faith and
credit of the State or by specific tax or non-tax revenue.
56ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a) (1970).
-7 See Committee Proposals at 2175-76 where it is stated:
These provisions apply to all state agencies including state colleges
and universities, toll road authorities, building authorities and any
agency set up in the future ....
58 See Committee Proposals at 2256-57 where it is stated:
The draft adopted on First Reading included the words 'whether
established by this Constitution or by law' at the end of the 'definition'
of 'State.' The purpose of the phrase was to limit to the maximum extent the possibility of creating an 'agency' which the courts might hold
was not an 'agency of the State.' The proposed substitution, 'public
agency created by the State,' serves the same purpose.
It is interesting to note that the committee made a purposeful effort to
emphasize the legislature's power to create state agencies for whose debts
the full faith and credit of the state could be pledged.
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to bring all such agencies within the proscription laid down at
the beginning of the section - "No State debt shall be incurred
except as provided in this Section,'"" - and thereby obviate the
possibility that any such agency "might, through lease or other
arrangement, attempt to by-pass the requirements for authorizing the incurrence of debt." 6 The committee supported the proposal on two grounds. First:
The proposal makes all forms of borrowing by the state and
all
6
its agencies and authorities subject to the same restrictions. 1
And second:
The proposed section will prevent universities and toll road
authorities [as well as other agencies] from entering into large
construction projects to be paid from student fees or project revenues without legislative approval. On the other hand, clearly justifiable projects to be paid from earned revenues
should encounter
62
little difficulty in obtaining such approval.
The committee's effort to bring such "large construction
projects" within legislative scrutiny is a laudable one. Indeed,
it is advisable that the financing of statewide internal improvements be subjected to legislative inspection and study. But in
broadening the definition of "state debt" to include any agency
of the state which is arguably a "department, authority, public
corporation or quasi-public corporation of the State, any State
college or university, or any other public agency created by the
State" and thereby bringing such agencies within the constitutional proscription that "state debt" shall be incurred only as
provided in article IX section 9, the drafters concurrently extended the umbrella of the state's full faith and credit to cover
agencies heretofore left to fend for themselves in economic storms
of their own creation. The Constitution of 1870, in the most
forceful language, specifically prohibited any such extension:
The state shall never pay, assume or become responsible for
the debts or liabilities of, or in any manner give, loan or extend its
credit to or in aid of any public or other corporation, association
or individual.63
The soft successor of this potent prohibition is found in
article VIII section 1 (a) of the new constitution: "Public funds,
D ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a) (1970).
60 Committee Proposals at 2176.
61 Id. at 2182.

-Id. at 2183.

'63
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 20 (1870)

(emphasis added).
See also BRADEN & COHN 197-98 where it is stated:
It would appear that this section was aimed at two mid-Nineteenth
Century problems arising from the drive for internal improvements particularly, railroads and canals. One was the use of state credit or
funds to assist private entrepreneurs engaged in building such improve-

ments. The other was fear that the state might be induced to bail out
local governments that had gotten deeply into debt, usually in connection
with internal improvements.
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property or credit shall be used only for public purposes.' ' 4 The
committee justified its proposed substitution on the following
grounds:
Article IV, Section 20, of the present constitution prohibits
the state from assuming the debts of or loaning credit to any public
or private corporation or individual. Illinois courts have rarely
utilized this section to prevent state financial aid to private persons
or institutions . . .

Instead, the courts have developed the public

purpose doctrine to determine whether a given transaction accomplishes a proper governmental function ...

The proposed lan-

guage removes the prohibition against assuming debts'or loaning
credit and substitutes the public purpose test. 5
It is true that Illinois courts had infrequently applied the
constitutional prohibition of article IV section 20 in a hard and
fast manner,6 6 but the substitution of an allegedly workable "public purpose test" seems more theoretical than real. The committee attempted to assist in the application of the substituted test
by stating:
In this context, a public purpose is served whenever the appropriation is to be used for governmental purposes and a non-governmental organization is essentially a conduit
or agent of the state in
6 7
implementing its governmental purposes.

The test sought to be substituted appears to be an unsatisfactory one for three reasons. First, Illinois courts have held
"public purpose" to include a myriad of objectives. 6
Second,
the contours of the "public purpose test" have never been clearly
defined by Illinois courts. Indeed one case, by way of judicial
dictum, has stated that "public purpose" is an elastic concept,
capable of expansion to meet conditions of a complex society
that were not within the contemplation of the framers of a constitution.6 9 Third but most significant, Illinois courts have held
11

art. VIII, § 1 (1970).
Committee Proposals at 2010.
66 Section 20 of article IV of the 1870 Constitution has frequently been
invoked in cases which come before Illinois courts, but has seldom been the
decisive issue. It appears that there have been only three successful invocations of section 20, two of which are rather indirect. See Schuler v. Board
of Education, 370 Ill. 107, 18 N.E.2d 174 (1938); Chicago Motor Club v.
Kinney, 329 Ill. 120, 160 N.E. 163 (1928); Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304,
110 N.E. 130 (1915).
67 Committee Proposals at 2009-10.
The committee prefixed the quoted
statement with this remark:
The first sentence limits the use of public funds, property and credit
to a public purpose. It permits the state and its political subdivisions
to enter into financial arrangements with governmental or non-governmental organizations whenever a public purpose will be served thereby.
(emphasis added).
66See generally Krebs v. Board of Trustees of Teachers' Retirement
System, 410 Ill. 435, 102 N.E.2d 321 (1951) ; People ex rel. Lawless v. City
of Quincy, 395 Ill. 182, 69 N.E.2d 892 (1946) ; People v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 392 Ill. 77, 64 N.E.2d 4 (1945).
69 People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago R.R. Terminal Authority, 14 Ill.
2d 230, 151 N.E.2d 311 (1958). See generally Continental Illinois Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 42
64

65

ILL. CONST.
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that what is for the public good and what are "public purposes"
are questions to be decided, in the first instance, by the legislature
and that in deciding a question of what is a "public purpose,"
the legislature is vested with wide discretion.7 0 Against this
background of decisional law, it appears that the limits of
"public purpose" are bounded solely by the imagination and
ingenuity of legislators. Moreover, it is difficult to perceive how
the substituted "public purpose test" can be applied by the judiciary to check the legislature which, in the first instance and with
wide discretion, decides for itself what is a "public purpose."
In short, the legislature's determination on the matter appears,
under the new charter, to be constitutionally decisive.
As the bureaucratic fingers of state government elongate and
seek new areas to control, the institutionalization of the circular
"public purpose test" in the new constitution leaves the judiciary
without constitutional ground on which to stand to check legislative overborrowing. The unequivocal constitutional prohibition
against assuming the debts of or loaning credit to any public or
private corporation or individual was the strongest barricade
the judiciary had at its disposal in restraining any hasty legislative propensity to solve through borrowing the financial difficulties of an insolvent "public or other corporation, association
or individual." If one hundred years of case law demonstrates
that the old prohibition was seldom a decisive issue, perhaps it is
because the legislature was indisposed to run afoul of its absolute
language. At any rate, the broad definition of "state debt" and
the circular quality of the "public purpose test" provide practically no ground from which the bench may check legislative use
of the full faith and credit of the state. The constitutionalization
of these principles may, so far as judicial restraint on legislative
borrowing is concerned, foreshadow a shift from infrequent
restraint to no restraint.
A truly sound understanding of the ramifications of this
increase in the number of potential beneficiaries under the expansive definition of "state debt" and the constitutionalization
of the "public purpose test" cannot be developed until other similar extensions of the legislative power to borrow are examined.
The most significant of these protracted powers follow from the
removal of the dollar lid on casual borrowing and the emasculation of the once required referendum.
As stated earlier in this comment, the 1870 Constitution
Ill. 2d 385, 251 N.E.2d 253 (1969); Antle v. Tuchbreiter, 414 Ill. 571, 111
N.E.2d 836 (1953) ; People ex rel. Douglas v. Barrett, 370 Ill. 464, 19 N.E.2d
340 (1939); Martens v. Porardy, 264 Ill. 178, 106 N.E. 266 (1914).
70 People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago Regional Port District, 4 Ill. 2d
363, 123 N.E.2d 92 (1954).
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permitted the legislature to borrow, by simple majority vote, up
to $250,000 to meet casual failures in revenue.7 1 Amounts exceeding that figure required a referendum at which the proposed
law authorizing the debt had to receive a majority of votes cast
for the members of the general assembly at such election in
order to become law.7 2 Other strict provisions with respect to
publication,73 retirement,"4 and disposition of funds generated by
the debt75 also impacted the enactment authorizing the debt.
Today, the amount of money the Illinois General Assembly
is empowered to borrow is unlimited,7 provided it can muster a
7
If
three-fifths majority of the members elected to each house.
the assembly is unable to do so, only then is it required to resort
to the people for approval," and a mere majority of those voting
on the question is needed7 9 for the debt legislation to become
law.
After having heard from over one hundred and fifty witnesses ° and examined more than twenty other authorities, as
well as statutes and staff papers,8' the Revenue and Finance Committee proposed that the restrictions imposed on the legislature
by the old constitution be eased. The proposal was supported by
three committee contentions: (1) that the existing restrictions
had not accomplished their intended purpose; (2) that constitutional state debt limitations restrain borrowing far less than was
71

ILL. CONST. art.

72 Id.
74

IV, § 18 (1870).

Id.
Id.

75Id.

art. IX, § 9(b) (1970).
Initially the Committee on Revenue and Finance submitted a proposal calling for a two-thirds majority:
The act shall be approved either:
1. By a majority of the members elected and serving in each house of
the General Assembly and by a majority of the electors voting on the
question at a referendum held at the next general election; or
2. By two-thirds of the members elected and serving in each house of
the General Assembly.
Committee Proposalsat 2174 (emphasis added). This was later reduced to a
three-fifths majority.
It is also worthy of note that the Style Committee inverted the order
in which the alternatives appeared in the Revenue and Finance Committee's
first proposal. See Committee Proposals at 2256 and ILL. CONST. art. IX,
§ 9(b)
(1970).
8
7 ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(b) (1970).
1 See Committee Proposals at 2175 where it is stated:
The General Assembly may, by simple majority vote, submit the
question of authorizing a debt issue to the people for referendum vote at
a general election. Approval by a simple majority of those voting on
the question is then required. (emphasis added).
Compare this language with that of the old constitution: shall . . . have
been submitted to the people, and have received a majority of the votes
cast for members of the general assembly at such election.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (1870) (emphasis added).
80 Committee Proposals at 2193-99.
8' Id. at 2200-01.
76

ILL. CONST.

77Id.
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commonly believed; and (3) that the present constitutional restrictions resulted in increased interest and other costs.
With respect to the first contention, the committee argued:
These provisions have not accomplished their intended purpose. In Illinois, as in other states, it has proved possible for the
using revenue bonds, building authorities, and
state to borrow 2by
similar devices.,
In support of this contention, the committee chronicled legislative attempts to circumvent the constitutional debt limitation
through the use of "building authorities. ' ' S 3 The committee cited
the Illinois Armory Board of 1935, 84 the Illinois State Public
Building Authority of 1941,15 the new Illinois Building Authority of 1961,861 and finally, the Highway Trust Authority of
1969.87 The committee pointed out that the constitutionality of
each "building authority" was tested in the courts, resulting in
apparently inconsistent holdings: (1) the act authorizing the
1935 Armory Board was held to be constitutional;"8 (2) the Act
authorizing the 1941 Authority was held to be unconstitutional ;"
(3) as changed, the act authorizing the 1941 Authority was held
to be constitutional ;90 but the act authorizing the 1969 Trust
Authority was held to be unconstitutional."
Any surface inconsistency among the four supreme court
-2 Id. at 2176.
83 Id.
at 2176-77. See also HEINs at vi where it is stated:
After 1900, mounting pressure to provide public improvements led
some state legislatures to search for means of borrowing which would
bypass constitutional restrictions. This search led to the development of
revenue bonds, public corporations, lease-purchase agreements, and reimbursement obligations - devices which have enabled states to borrow

funds without creating debt in the eyes of constitutional provisions.
State debt created by these devices may be termed nonguaranteed debt
in the sense that states do not pledge their general funds for the repayment of such debt.
84 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 129, §§ 223-228 (1971).
835 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 201-213 (1941).
16ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 213.1 et seq. (1971).
87 Laws of July 8 & 10, 1969, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 101-1 to 101-20
(repealed 1972 by P.A. 77-1861, §§ 7 & 8).
88
See Loomis v. Keehn, 400 Ill. 337, 80 N.E.2d 368 (1948) holding that
the Armory Board Act did not violate section 18 of article IV of the 1870
Constitution because the state did not irrevocably obligate itself to lease the
buildings to be erected by the board.
'9See People ex rel. Greening v. Green, 382 Ill. 577, 47 N.E.2d 465
(1943) holding that since the board to be established for the Illinois State
Building Authority was to consist of all elected officials and a member of
the Illinois Supreme Court, the Authority could not validly claim to be
separate from the state and the authorized debt was therefore a debt of the
state in violation of section 18 of article IV.
90 See Berger v. Howlett, 25 Ill. 2d 128, 182 N.E.2d 673 (1962) holding
that since the board of seven members created in conjunction with the new
Illinois Building Authority could not have a member who was an elected
official, this and other changes met the objection raised in the Greening case,
supra note 89, and the act was valid.
91See Rosemont Building Supply, Inc. v. Illinois Highway Trust Authority, 45 Ill. 2d 243, 258 N.E.2d 569 (1970) holding that the act establishing the Highway Trust Authority was invalid because the financial structure
of the Authority could not be considered independent of the state and,
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decisions treating the above listed "building authorities" is resolved by close inquiry into the cases. The thread which unifies
the cases is the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to permit the
legislature to circumvent the old debt limitation unless the entity
it creates is clearly separate and distinct from the state itself.
Other such independent agencies do exist, as the committee
pointed out92 and there is merit to the committee's drive for a
constitutional solution eliminating the need for this kind of legislative "end-around." But after reviewing the cases, it appears
that any legislative frustration might have been allayed by better
draftsmanship. It is also worthy of note that with the first use of
state public authorities for the purpose of circumventing section
18 of article IV occurring in 1935, the prohibition had, for sixtyfive years, ably performed its intended purpose.
As to the second contention, the committee determined that:
It cannot be definitely proved that debt limits are completely
ineffective in limiting the amount of state borrowing, but93it is clear
that they are far less effective than commonly believed.
This determination was arrived at after the committee had reviewed studies of the effect of constitutional limitations on state
debt and investigated the debt situation in those states having
consitutional restrictions,14 such as Delaware and Massachusetts,
and those states which have none, such as New Hampshire,
Vermont, Connecticut, Mississippi and Tennessee.5
Three delegates vigorously dissented from the committee's
determination on this point." Their position was that while the
current debt limit was an anachronism and completely unrealistic, the majority proposal was an unacceptable modification because it denied the people the right to vote upon all large,
long-term bond issues that must be repaid through the labor of
therefore, the debts of the Authority were the debts of the state in violation
of section 18 of article IV.
92 See Committee Proposals at 2179 where the committee states:
Several other agencies of state government also issue bonds which
are not subject to the debt limitation or referendum requirement of Section 18. For example, state colleges and universities issue bonds for
construction of athletic facilities and student unions to be paid for by
earnings and student fees. Other facilities, such as college dormitories
and toll roads, are paid for from the proceeds of bonds which are retired
solely from the earnings of the facilities.
It is true that these agencies may issue bonds unfettered by section 18
of article IV, but note that the issuance of such bonds does not involve the
full faith and credit of the state.
93 Committee Proposals at 2181-82.
94 See HEINs at 9.
11Committee Proposals at 2181.
States can be divided into roughly four groups in regard to power to
incur debt: (1) states with no significant constitutional limitation; (2) states
with absolute limitations; (3) states with no limitations but requiring voter
approval by referendum; and (4) states requiring referendum approval but
still 96
retaining a maximum debt limit.
d. at 2183.
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taxpayers who had no voice with respect to incurring the debt.
More immediate in rebuttal of the committee's majority contention, there was ample evidence to find that constitutional barriers
did, indeed, prevent runaway borrowing and wasteful expendiThe following quote soundly states the dissenting poture. 9
sition:
Debt limits do not provide perfect expenditure controls, but
such limitations tend to discourage loose spending practices. If the
legislature knows it cannot borrow to meet expenditures, it must
take steps to keep expenditures within anticipated revenues. In
addition, referenda requirements held the people to focus attention
on the state's fiscal processes, thereby better insuring more effective, democratic control of state expenditures 5
Id. at 2184-85 where the dissenters stated:
The majority report contends that it cannot be definitely proven that
constitutional debt limits are effective in limiting the amount of state
borrowing. The majority report, however, failed to consider all of the
evidence of this point.
B. V. Ratchford, an expert on state debt limits, has grouped the
states into three groups according to the methods used to authorize borrowing - legislative action, constitutional amendment, and referenda.
His findings showed that the states in which the legislatures authorize
borrowing had debts which were more than twice as large, both in per
capita terms and in relation to personal income, as the states in which
borrowing must be authorized by constitutional amendment. The states
which use referenda fell between these extremes on both bases of measurement. Ratchford, 'State and Local Debt Limitations,' Proceedings
of the National Tax Association 215-29 (1958).
The Committee report infers that a constitutional requirement of a
referendum on state debt tends to cause states to borrow through revenue bonds, building authorities, and similar devices in order to avoid the
referendum requirements. The study by Professor Ratchford, however,
refutes this inference.
Ratchford showed that non-guaranteed obligations have been used to
a greater extent in those states in which the legislatures have freedom
to borrow than in states with referenda requirements. He concluded
that 'factors other than the avoidance of constitutional and statutory
debt limits are involved in the use of revenue bonds.'
Frank M. Landers, director of the Michigan Budget Division, stated
in regard to debt limits that 'it is not difficult to find situations where the
existence of constitutional barriers prevented runaway borrowing and,
presumably, wasteful expenditure.' Major Problems in State Constitutional Revision (edited by W. Brooke Graves) 233 (1967).
As indicated in the Committee report, 'in Delaware and Massachusetts the legislature is free to borrow any amount for any purpose but
special majorities of three-fourths and two-thirds, respectively, are required.' The state debt of Delaware and Massachusetts in 1966, in per
capita terms, was $653.23 and $329.19, respectively. The debt of all
states for the same year, in per capita terms was only $151.57. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Fiscal Balance in the
American Federal System 286-87 (1967).
Connecticut, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Vermont have no constitutional debt limits, as indicated in the Committee report. The state
debt in each of these four states in 1966, in per capita terms, was
$429.24, $197.21, $59.51, and $191.48, respectively. In each of these
states except Tennessee, the state debt, in per capita terms exceeds that
of the average for all states.
The Committee report indicates that Mississippi has no constitutional debt limit. This is in error, since the Mississippi Constitution
provides that the State bonded indebtedness cannot be in excess of 11/
times the sum of all revenue collected in the state during any one of the
four preceding fiscal years. Mississippi Constitution, Section 115.
'1

98 Id. at 2186.
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As to its third contention, the committee found that:
[T]he existence of constitutional debt limitations has increased
interest costs and has caused the expenditure of large sums of
money for additional administrative and insurance costs, resulting
from the use of authorities and other techniques devised to avoid
state debt limits.99
This finding seems valid and was neither dissented from at
the committee stage nor challenged on the floor. But whether
the additional expense could be justified as constitutional "overhead" imposed by the people on those who daily run the business
of government to insure restraint in pursuing credit transactions
was never raised. Even though it was more costly to so inhibit
their agents, if the restrictions protected the taxpayer from
overborrowing, the price may well have been worth paying.
Having eliminated the ceiling on borrowing and having
provided for passage of the debt producing enactments by a
three-fifths majority, the drafters turned their attention to an
alternative method of authorizing the legislation in the event a
three-fifths majority could not be had.
As an alternative method of passing debt legislation, the
new constitution provides that a simple legislative majority plus
a simple majority of the electorate voting on the question will
enact a bill proposing state debt into law. 1°0 Reduced to its operative impact, what this means is that the burden of proving the
merit of putting the State of Illinois into debt is no longer upon
those advocating the indebtedness. Prior to the 1970 Constitution,
those advocating the debt were required to convince a majority
of those voting for members of the general assembly of the merit
of their proposal.101 Under those circumstances, a voter indifferent to, opposed to, or ignorant of, the proposition would refrain
from voting on it and this would operate to the disadvantage of
those advocating the debt. The framers of the 1870 Constitution
obviously believed that those who would put this state into debt
ought to be charged with the burden of informing the electorate
of the wisdom of doing so.
By allowing a majority of those voting on the question to
effect enactment of debt legislation, those indifferent to, opposed
to, or ignorant of, the proposition must now vote negatively on it
to prevent enactment. It appears that the framers of the 1970
Constitution believe that those who would keep this state from
going into debt ought to be charged with the burden of informing the electorate of the wisdom of not doing so.
The new constitution retains the requirement that the law
19Id. at 2182. See also HEINS at 82-84.
'00 ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(b) (1970).
' ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (1870).
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authorizing the debt also provide for its retirement. 10 2 No specific reasons for eliminating the publication requirements or the
constitutional directive as to the disposition of funds generated
by the debt can be found, but in view of the general easing of
restrictions contemplated by the drafters of the new constitution,
it is not surprising that they were eliminated without mention
and the utility of the provisions was somewhat questionable.
Founded on the three basic contentions discussed earlier,
the committee stated the goals it sought to achieve in proposing
the state debt provision of the new Revenue Article:
The Committee desires to limit state borrowing to reasonable
amounts and for reasonable purposes. It also desires to reduce the
cost of borrowing to a minimum and to insure that decisions to
borrow are publicly arrived at by the proper authorities.
The proposal makes all forms of borrowing by the state and all
its agencies and authorities subject to the same restrictions. Under this proposal, there would be no need to create authorities and
commissions to circumvent debt restrictions.
The requirement of a two-thirds [later reduced to three-fifths]
vote in the General Assembly, or a simple majority vote plus a
referendum, is a wise check upon possible overborrowing. Clearly,
legislators pressed between demands for higher spending and lower
taxes face a strong temptation to satisfy both demands by postponing taxation through borrowing. The proposed section will
insure that no borrowing will be authorized unless it has wide support among the voters or bipartisan support in the legislature.
Moreover, in either case, the proposed debt limitation will be sub03
ject to closer public scrutiny.
The committee's desire "to limit state borrowing to reasonable amounts and for reasonable purposes" is an admirable one.
However, it is difficult to imagine how the omission of any sort
of dollar limitation will assist in accomplishing this end, especially when coupled with the general relaxation of restrictions
already discussed. Its desire to "reduce the cost of borrowing
to a minimum" and to make "all forms of borrowing by the state
and all its agencies and authorities subject to the same restrictions" is equally admirable, as are its efforts to eliminate the
"need to create authorities and commissions to circumvent debt
restriction."
But as discussed earlier, these were not insurmountable impediments to truly necessary debt financing. The
fact that the legislature need resort to the people's approval
only if it fails to muster a three-fifths majority, which is somewhat less than the strongest "bipartisan support" imaginable,
coupled with the difficulty in comprehending how "the proposed
102 ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (b)(1970).
103

Committee Proposals at 2182.
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debt limitation will be subject to closer public scrutiny"' 10 4 than
it was when a referendum and strict publication requirements
were mandated, may leave many an Illinois taxpayer uneasy
about this newly acquired legislative power.
In attempting to achieve the lofty new goals enumerated in
the committee's comment on the proposed article, the drafters
appear to have overlooked the possibility of future fiscal indiscretion which was anticipated and checked by the old constitution.
Today, from a practical standpoint, the sanctuary of Illinois'
credit is constitutionally unguarded. Under the banner of serving a "public purpose," the legislature stands at the portal empowered to open wide the doors to welcome a myriad of state
agencies within; guaranteeing the debts of those who are insolvent or pledging the credit of the state on behalf of those
who are not. All this by a mere three-fifths majority within the
control of a General Assembly admittedly "pressed between demands for higher spending and lower taxes," and faced with "a
strong temptation to satisfy both demands by postponing taxation
through borrowing."
THE REVENUE ARTICLE'S FIRST-BORN,

THE TRANSPORTATION BOND ACT

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the Committee on Revenue and Finance, the delegates to the 1970 Constitutional Convention, and even the voters who ratified the new
constitution were all possessed of a significant degree of confidence in the fiscal responsibility of the Illinois General Assembly.
The committee which proposed article IX section 9 believed that
it had placed "wise checks" upon legislative overborrowing, but
the majority proposal also seems to be founded on an assumption
of internal legislative restraint with respect to borrowing.
In this regard it is significant to note that even before the
1970 Constitution became effective, the Illinois General Assembly
passed legislation authorizing a $900,000,000 bond issue. The
Transportation Bond Act was passed by the Illinois House of
Representatives on June 25, 1971 by a vote of 119 to 44.105 Three
days later it passed the Illinois Senate by a vote of 49 to 10.16
The 1970 Illinois Constitution, ratified by the voters on December 15, 1970, became generally effective on July 1, 1971.107 On
July 2, 1971, the Transportation Bond Act was approved by
See ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c) (1970) which provides:
Reports and records of the obligation, receipt and use of public funds
of the State, units of local government and school districts are public
records available for inspection by the public according to law.
105 H.R. JOUR., 77th General Assembly, #81,
June 25, 1971 at 359 (1971).
106S. JOUR., 77th General Assembly, #83, June 28, 1971 at 29 (1971).
107 ILL. CONST. adoption schedule, § 1 (1970).
104
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Governor Ogilvie."' The passage of the Transportation Bond
Act two days before the 1970 Constitution became generally
effective gave rise to a suit testing the power of the legislature
to pass anticipatory legislation, People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis. 1" 9
While the Ogilvie case offered the Illinois Supreme Court one of
its first opportunities to graft judicially interpretative flesh onto
the skeleton of the new constitution, it is important in this discussion because it highlights the legislature's flexing of its new
constitutional muscle at so early a date. While the arguments
in favor of and opposed to the Transportation Bond Act are
many, one thing remains clear: reduced to its simplest elements,
Ogilvie spotlights the fact that the Illinois General Assembly
did not pause long enough to permit the new constitution to become effective before it took steps to borrow $900,000,000.
In upholding the constitutionality of the Act,"' the court
made judicial announcement of some of the changes worked by
the new constitution and already commented on in this article."'
In holding that the funds generated by the Transportation Bond
Act were indeed to be expended for a "public purpose" the court
relied upon article XIII section 7 of the new constitution, the
Preamble to the Transportation Bond Act, and the Illinois view
that whether a purpose is public or private is primarily to be
determined by the legislature."1 In other words, of the three legs
which gave tripod support to the court's holding on the "public
purpose" issue, two were enfeebled by the application of a circuitous test which commands that the constitutionality of an act
be settled by the self-serving utterance of its draftsmen. 113 While
the determinative issue in Ogilvie was the legislature's power to
enact anticipatory legislation, the court's holding on the "public
purpose" issue foreshadows an era of legislative prominence in
the area with no apparent constitutional or decisional foundation
from which it can be challenged.
CONCLUSION

Though it is unquestioned that state constitutions restrict
the powers of the legislature, no state constitution is a unanimous expression of the will of the people who ratify it or the
108 LAWS OF ILL., 77th General Assembly, 1971 Session, Volume 1, P.A.
77-150 at 276 (1972).
109 49 11. 2d 476, 274 N.E.2d 87 (1971).
For a full treatment of the
anticipatory legislation question see: Comment, People ex rel. Ogilvie v.

Lewis: A Procedure for the Enactment of Anticipatory Legislation in Illinois, 6 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 347 (1973).

11o 49 Ill. 2d 476, 482-83, 274 N.E.2d 87, 91-92.
'I' Id. at 484-89, 274 N.E.2d at 92-95.
112 Id. at 485-87, 274 N.E.2d at 93-94.

See also People ex rel. Douglas v.
Barrett, 370 Ill. 64, 19 N.E.2d 340 (1939) ; People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 Ill. 77, 64 N.E.2d 4 (1945).
113 See pages 419, 420 supra.
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delegates who draft it; it is impossible for all to agree on each
of its components. Inevitably, constitutions are the products of
the give and take of compromise, the push and pull of differing
The combat in Springfield which propolitical philosophies.
duced the new state debt provision has left the question of what
should have been done utterly moot. Article IX section 9 is
alive and well and it has already sired the Transportation Bond
Act. The question for today is to what dimensions will the family
of debt producing legislation be permitted to grow? In attempting to answer that question, this comment seeks to point out that
in the dust overhanging the battlefield which became article IX
section 9, there should linger more than a particle of concern.
The Committee on Revenue and Finance would have us believe that though the legislature be "pressed between demands for
higher spending and lower taxes" while also faced with "a strong
temptation to satisfy both demands by postponing taxation
through borrowing," the General Assembly will be "wisely
checked" by article IX section 9 and its own internal attitude
of self-restraint. One hundred years of legislation attempts to
circumvent the old restrictions and a ten minute understanding
of human nature strongly suggest otherwise.
Charles S. Bargiel

